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THE MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE
PAYMENT SYSTEM:
Its Impact on the Quality of Health Care Received by the Elderly
by Marcy Cohen
The Impact of DRGs on the
Quality of Health Care
On April 20, 1983, a prospective payment system
(PPS) for Medicare payment of inpatient hospital services
was established under 1886 (d) of the Social Security Act
(the Act), enacted by the Social Security Amendments of
1983 (Pub.L. 98-21) effective October 1, 1983.' Under this
system, Medicare payment is made at a predetermined,
specific rate for each discharge 2 All discharges are classified
according to a list of diagnosis-related groups (DRGs).3 This
list currently contains 470 specific categories.4
Currently, the formula used to calculate payment for
a specific case takes an individual hospital's payment rate
per case (comprised of a hospital-specific portion adjusted
for area wages) and multiplies it by the weight of the DRG
to which the case is assigned.5 The hospital specific
portion, however, is gradually being phased out, and by
October 1986 all hospitals that are subject to the prospec-
tive payment system will be paid at the national federal
rate.6 Each DRG weight represents the average resources
required to care for cases in that particular DRG relative
to the national average resources consumed per case by
the average hospital.7 Part of the process in determining
average resources takes into consideration average lengths
of stay. So while the DRG does not specifically allow for
a set number of days, this has already been worked into
the formula for calculating them.' While the developers of
DRGs recognized that length of stay may not be as accurate
an indicator of the level of output as actual costs, they
justified using it because of its practical availability:9 "DRG
is an attempt to define a 'product' of an industry that had
previously neglected to do so. The product is comprised
of the specific set of outputs received by the patient":0
Under the prospective payment system, health care
providers are paid at a predetermined flat amount for each
Medicare beneficiary according to the DRG assigned upon
discharge. Under the old "cost-plus"" system, hospitals were
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paid for each service provided. The more services provided,
the more money a hospital received, 2 Accordingly, it was
in a hospital's interest to provide excessive services and to
keep a patient hospitalized as long as possible.' 3 The func-
tion of a Utilization Review Committee, however, was to
assure that only medically necessary services were provided
to the patient. While this sounds similar to the prospective
payment system, the difference is that there was not a limit
on the amount that could be reimbursed to the hospital
as long as there was a need for those services which
satisfied the Medicare regulations. Under DRGs those in-
centives are gone.' 4 "Prospective rates are a means of ex-
erting more external influences over hospital activities and
plans and as a means of building cost containment con-
straints and/or incentives into hospital payment."" Implicit
in the system are the incentives to cut costs by shortening
a patient's length of stay and to increase the number of in-
patient admissions. 6 Therefore, if a patient is released hav-
ing consumed fewer resources than the calculated national
average consumed for the assigned DRG, the hospital may
realize a profit. Conversely, if a patient consumes more
resources than the national average, the hospital must ab-
sorb the additional costs and suffer a financial loss.
This legislation took an unprecedented three months
from the time of its introduction to Congress to passage
into law.!7 Its aim was to control rapidly rising health care
costs while assuring the solvency of the Medicare trust fund.
In 1966 when Medicare was first implemented, it accounted
for $1.1 billion of the total $5.8 billion federal health care
expenditures.!8 By 1982, the amount had risen to $36.3
billion spent for inpatient hospitalization of a total $87.5
billion. 9 According to the American Medical Association,
the government has stated the following goals for the
system: (1) maintain beneficiary access to quality care, (2)
reduce cost reporting burdens, (3) incentives for efficiency,
(4) no increase in expenditures, (5) pay as a prudent buyer,
(6) predictable impact, (7) implement quickly, and (8) easy
to administer.20
Has the system fulfilled the governments goals? The
first official evaluation, conducted by the General Account-
ing Office (GAO) and requested by Senator John Heinz as
Chairman of the Senate Special Committee on Aging,
found that under the DRG system, patients are being
discharged "quicker and sicker, and some may even be
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discharged prematurely. In too many cases, these older
Americans are being sent into a 'no care zone without
access to the health care they so urgently need"2 The "no
care zone" predominantly affects those patients whose
financial resources place them above the level for Medicaid
eligibility but who do not have sufficient personal resources
to privately pay for in home health care services not covered
by Medicare. Family members can often substitute for pro-
fessional in-home health care workers; but realistically, all
elderly persons are not so fortunate. Senator Heinz
stressed that Medicare does not specify the number of
hospital days allowed under the DRGs.22 Further, the GAO
report shows patients are being "improperly" told 'that they
have to leave because their Medicare coverage has run
out:23 According to Senator Heinz, 'any hospital that
dumps a patient because the 'DRG has run out' either
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doesnt understand the system or is misrepresenting the
design intentionally out of greed."
24
While Congress was aware that under the change
hospitals would be tempted to save costs by shortening
patients' stays, experts argued that some reduction in length
of stay was possible without sacrificirig quality of care 25
In fact they argued shorter stays might actually be beneficial
in some cases by reducing the risk of infection.26
The average length of stay since DRG implementation
has indeed been shortened. In 1983 the average length of
stay per discharge was 9.5 days.27 In 1984 this was reduced
to 7.5 days.28 "Patients are being discharged from hospitals
after shorter lengths of stay and in a poorer state of health
than prior to PPS. 29 This by itself does not necessarily in-
dicate that the prospective payment system is unsuccessful.
Underlying the "quicker and sicker" theory is the assump-
tion that the extra two days were needed. Studies are still
inconclusive as to whether the extra days spent at home
are hazardous, or for that matter, beneficial to the patient.
The old cost-based system was responsive to in-
dividual patient and provider differences.3" The DRG
system is based upon how effectively individuals "fit into
those categories" and where the facility is located.3 1 Fac-
tors such as case mix, percentage of Medicare beneficiaries
served, and the percentage of indigent care shouldered by
an institution are not taken into account.32
The prospective payment system has drawn many dif-
fering opinions on the effectiveness of DRGs and the
effect on the quality of health care received by the elderly.
It is not infallible, and numerous persons are concerned and
questioning whether or not DRGs are the solution that we
so desperately seek. The system directly impacts on various
groups, including beneficiaries and their families, health care
providers, doctors, and community health care agencies and
institutions. While it is unclear just how successful this new
system will be, it is clear that providers are confused about
the implementation of the system. Consequently, if the
system is not administered properly, it is quite possible that
the elderly will not receive all that they are entitled to under
the system.
Health Care experts have isolated some adverse con-
sequences of the prospective payment system on the quality
of care received by the elderly. Recognized among the most
important are (1) that some discharges from the hospital
may be premature, (2) the availability and affordability of
the appropriate follow-up care may not be guaranteed, and
(3) the medical needs of patients referred to nursing homes,
home health care, and other forms of care provided in the
community could be greater than providers are equipped
to handle.33
Working solely from averages, DRGs presently fail to
recognize the severity of a particular illness or provide reim-
bursement for multiple ailments.3 4 This matter is currently
being investigated in order to determine any necessary
changes to address these concerns. Additionally, Senator
Heinz is planning to introduce a bill by the end of February
1986 which would adjust payments for severity of illness."
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) has
responded to these concerns; they
stress that the weights assigned to the various
DRGs reflect the actual, average intensity of ser-
vices provided to patients whose cases fall
within them.... We are satisfied that they ade-
quately reflect the intensity of services provid-
ed. . .. The geometric mean lengths of stay are
not intended to be an expression of the typical
length of stay for the DRG. Their main purpose
is to serve as a benchmark for the computa-
tion of outlier payments.3 6
A hospital can qualify for an additional payment or
"outlier,' reimbursed at a per diem rate, for cases which ex-
ceed the mean length of stay for the DRG by twenty days
or fixed standard deviations from the mean (whichever is
the fewer number of days).3 These are called "day outllers
Additionally, if a hospital cost exceeds 1.5 times the
appropriate prospective payment rate or $12,000 (which-
ever is greater), it may request additional payments in the
form of cost outliers.38 If the Peer Review Organization
(PRO) approves the medical necessity and appropriateness
of the outlier services with respect to the entire length of
a patient's stay, and if the PRO certifies that all of the ser-
vices were medically necessary and delivered in the most
appropriate setting, the outlier charges will be paid.
3 9 It
seems that this creates an incentive for the doctors and/or
the hospitals to keep patients in the hospital long enough
so that they would be classified as outliers, and the hospital
would be paid accordingly. If this were the case, Medicare
would not save money, and the new system would not
operate much differently from the old. The system, however,
is set up to guard against this problem, and the total pro-
portion of outlier payments are limited to 6% of total pro-
spective payments for all hospitals.40
The fact that DRGs do not specifically address the
severity of the illness or consider multiple ailments may
serve as an impetus for physician and hospital conflicts.
Doctors often discover a second problem only after admit-
ting the patient and receiving test results days later. Accord-
ing to the PPS system, the hospital may only be reimbursed
for one DRG.41 This means that if the doctor treats the sec-
ond illness, the hospital will incur the financial loss.
However, if the patient leaves and is readmitted with the
second ailment at a later date, they can then be compen-
sated for their services. For example, an elderly man is
admitted to the hospital due to pneumonia.42 After In-
travenous feedings, problems with voiding, and placement
and removal of a catheter, it is discovered that the patient
needs to have prostrate surgery.43 If the patient undergoes
the surgery during this admission, the hospital will only be
reimbursed for the pneumonia.4 4 Is it fair to send this elderly
patient home only to have to return for surgery at a later
4 IN THE PUBUC INiTUST
date? Can we truly say that the quality of health care is
not being compromised?
In this respect the prospective payment system creates
a psychological and financial dilemma for the patient as
well as for the patients family. They must decide whether
the beneficiary will remain hospitalized and have the sec-
ond ailment treated at their own expense or leave the
hospital and return soon thereafter at Medicards expense.
If living in a rural community, this is an even more difficult
decision because the patient may have to travel a great
distance to the nearest hospital. It may simply be too dif-
ficult to return. The latter choice is not cost-effective, it
adversely affects the quality of care received by the patient
and is not consistent with the goals of the system. Addi-
tionally, there does not appear to be a sound medical reason
behind this policy; in fact, it seems contrary to proper
medical care. As a result, doctors are confronted with the
problem of medical and administrative decisionmaking not
necessarily in the best interest of the patient. Moreover,
elderly patients are often frightened of the hospital and have
a difficult time understanding the complex prospective
payment system. The complexity of the system and the
lack of understanding often leads to bad decisions. An unin-
formed elderly patient who wants to go home may make
a rash decision which increases her financial liability. It
seems obvious that the intent of the system was not to
create these kinds of problems, however, they are clearly
evident and need to be addressed by the Social Security
Administration.
The following scenario describes another problem the
elderly face: the problem of denied admission. An elderly
person sustains a fall, and x-rays reveal a compression frac-
ture of the spine.4 5 Under the present PPS mandates, the
hospital cannot admit the patient because treatment for
a compression fracture does not require hospitalization.
46
Alternate arrangements like home care or nursing home
care cannot be accomplished within a time frame to prop-
erly administer medical care4 7 The patient must either pay
on her own for hospital services or return home, often to
care for herself.4 8 In the foregoing situation, there is no ques-
tion that the administrative impact of the prospective pay-
ment system determined the quality of health care this pa-
tient received.
The DRG system may systematically undercompen-
sate hospitals for treating the frail elderly and result in at-
tempts by some hospitals to reduce or avoid altogether pro-
grams in geriatric medicine and admissions of frail elderly
persons. 49 Elderly patients often take longer than younger
persons to recuperate from hospitalization. Although age
is considered in evaluating DRG groupings, it is possible
that they may not allow for the lengthy time periods that
the elderly require, particularly the very old, frail elderly. The
elderly will become the undesirable patient 5" Until the DRG
system is revised, frail elderly over seventy years of age are
at a severe disadvantage.5 ' The system has already placed
them in the highest level of care.52 For instance, there is
no vehicle within the system for differentiating the eighty-
five year old from the seventy year old. With the average
life expectancy on the rise, it will not be unusual to have
many persons surviving well into their eighties and nineties.
Between 1960 and 1980 the population aged sixty-five and
over has increased 55%53 The proportion of elderly per-
sons increased during that period from 9.1% to 11.1%.5'
Demographers estimate that this population will increase
to 12.2% by 1990 and to 18.3% by 2030.
51
The Peer Review Organization (PRO)
In order to assure a check and balance for the pro-
spective payment system, Congress has mandated that all
participating hospitals contract with a Peer Review
Organization (PRO).5 6 PROs are responsible for conduct-
ing reviews of patient cases before, during, and after hospital
admissions.5 7 They are composed primarily of physicians
and other "peer" health professionals.
58
"Before Medicare patients are admitted to a hospital,
a main function of the PRO is to review records of patients
requesting 'elective" or nonemergency surgery, assuring that
surgery is not done unless necessary.59 Additionally, PROs
support procedures that can be performed on an outpatient
basis and, therefore, reduce costly hospital admission.60
While being treated as an outpatient may lead to a faster
and more comfortable recovery, this policy creates unfair
burdens for many elderly patients, particularly in rural com-
munities. Hospitals and ambulatory clinics are generally
located miles from residential areas. Having to experience
a procedure such as a cataract operation compounded by
a round trip to the hospital may add unnecessary stress
for an elderly patient. Consideration must also be given to
the fact that there may be complications or fears that need
to be allayed after the surgery. If they do not have the
capability or access to a second visit, many elderly are be-
ing shortchanged on the deserved quality of health care.
Where a PRO designates a particular procedure
as more appropriately performed on an out-
patient basis, any attempt to hospitalize a pa-
tient for that procedure must be clearly
documented or payment will be denied. There
is the possibility that many patients over the
age of 65 may not be good candidates for cer-
tain types of outpatient surgery. The emphasis
on outpatient procedures has to be balanced
in elderly patients but can be done so when co-
existing conditions necessitating hospitalization
are carefully documented.6'
The Peer Review Organization also participates in deci-
sions concerning Medicare coverage during the beneficiarys
hospitalization. 62 If the hospital believes that a beneficiary
is no longer entitled to coverage, it must have the agree-
ment of the physician or the PRO in the event that the
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physician disagrees or is unavailable. 63
"After Medicare patients are discharged from the
hospital, the PRO review considers whether admission was
necessary, whether appropriate treatment was given and
whether quality care was provided.'64 The result of this
review can be a denial notice for services already provid-
ed; however, the beneficiary will not be responsible for pay-
ment of such services unless the hospital had informed her
of her financial liability by written notice at the time of ad-
mission or during her hospitalization.6 The patient is
responsible, however, for any appropriate deductible or coin-
surance payments.6
The Appeals Process
Determinations made by the hospital and/or the Peer
Review Organization are appealable.67 The appeals pro-
cedure provides a safeguard for Medicare patients' health
care rights, although it may be procedurally difficult for
some hospitalized elderly to assert these rights, and their
financial liability may thus be increased. Many of the com-
plaints from the elderly suggest that they are unaware of
these procedures, and that they are not being accurately
informed about the new system. Additionally, many elder-
ly persons are simply intimidated by the legal process and
fail to seek out legal advice. Some hospitals now employ
patient representatives who can assist the elderly to assert
their rights.
The appeals procedure varies according to whether a
beneficiary is initially denied Medicare coverage prior to
admission or during a hospital stay.68 When a PRO denies
services prior to admission, as in the case of nonemergency
surgery, it must notify the beneficiary in writing, stating
(1) the reasons for denial, (2) the right to a reconsideration,
(3) when and how to request a reconsideration, and (4)
where to file a request.69 If the beneficiary wants her case
to receive a priority review, she must file for a reconsidera-
tion within three days following receipt of the denial.70 The
PRO then has three working days to respond.71 If the re-
quest has not been made within three days, the PRO has
thirty days in which to respond.72 A beneficiary has a max-
imum of sixty days to request a reconsideration.73 It is im-
portant to keep in mind that although the beneficiary can
submit any pertinent information, this review is simply done
on paper. This is not a hearing.
When denial occurs during the beneficiary's hospitaliza-
tion, the Utilization Review Committee, with the agreement
of either the physician or the PRO, must notify the bene-
ficiary in writing that she is no longer covered.74 Such notice
should include (1) the reasons for denial, (2) whether the
hospital issued the notice with the approval of the physi-
cian or the PRO, and (3) the appeals procedure.75
If the beneficiary disagrees with the hospital's notice
and wants to remain in the hospital contrary to the agree-
ment of the physician, she may request the PRO to review
the denial.76 The PRO has three working days to respond. 7
If still unsatisfied, the beneficiary may request a final recon-
sideration decision by the PRO.78
If, on the other hand, the PRO has already substituted
its judgment for that of the physician because the physi-
cian was unavailable or disagreed, the hospital must ask
the PRO to review the beneficiary's case.79 However, the
beneficiary is entitled to request a final PRO reconsidera-
tion. 80 It is important that a beneficiary make an immediate
request upon denial if she wishes to remain in the hospital
since Medicare will cover only two additional days if she
does not receive a favorable ruling.8' Any additional hospi-
talization days will be billed to the patient, Medicaid or any
other payor. In reality, the burden will most likely fall on
either the patient or Medicaid, since private insurance com-
panies generally abide by Medicards determination of non-
coverage. Consequently, the patient will need to decide
whether to remain hospitalized and use personal resources
or risk going home to a possible "no care zond' 2
Upon final denial, the beneficiary does have the right
to request a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
if the amount in controversy is at least $200; If still un-
satisfied, judicial review is available where the amount in
controversy is at least $2,000.83
For the hospitalized or bedridden elderly beneficiary
with limited resources, the appeals procedure could prove
to be a difficult process. While there are specialized at-
torneys competent to assist with these cases, access to
them is not always possible, particularly in rural, isolated
localities. In order to assure that the elderly exercise their
rights, it is crucial that they are informed.
The Impact of DRGs on
Community Health Care Provider Agencies
The prospective payment system has also affected the
home health care industry in terms of the acuity level and
the number of patients needing home care after a hospital
discharge.84 "Early assessment of the impact of DRGs have
unfortunately lacked an empirical basis which took into ac-
count a consumer perspective or which recognized the con-
tribution of the long term care system as a component of
the health care delivery system. This lack of an empirical
base prevents accurate analysis of a very critical policy ques-
tion: Do DRGs represent a cost containment policy or do
they actually represent a cost shift to individuals or to the
long term care system?"8"
The "ping pong effect, with respect to patients who
leave the hospital only to return due to complications, calls
into question the success of cost savings supposedly
achieved under the DRG system.86 "Many health care pro-
viders suggest that the true result of this approach, in the
absence of a developed inhome skilled care system, is simp-
ly cost-shifting to Medicaid, to Medicare beneficiaries, and
to the patients' families.'8 7 Is it realistic to look at cost sav-
ings only in terms of Medicards expenditures, or should the
focus be on the whole of the Federal and State govern-
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ments? If the cost to sustain other programs increases
because of Medicards cost savings, there will have to be
a source of funding to facilitate these programs. Most like-
ly, that source will be Medicaid or the beneficiary's personal
resources. Accepting the fact that there will be a cost-
shifting, will there be sufficient dollars to compensate?
DRGs promote the generally recognized idea that it is less
expensive to use alternative means of care other than
hospitals. Will the Federal government transfer some of the
dollars saved because of the prospective payment system
to these alternative means? There would probably still be
an overall savings, the goals of the prospective payment
system would be met, and patients would continue to
receive quality health care.
It is indicated that this may not be the case The
Gramm-Rudman Deficit Reduction Bill is proposing cuts
in Medicare expenditures, adding an extra burden. At a time
when these programs will need additional funds, it seems
very possible that they will receive even less.
Except in limited circumstances, the government does
not pay for nursing home or in-home health care other than
through Medicaid. So a reduction in these funds can only
add to problems that may arise because of the prospec-
tive payment system. If a person wants this kind of care,
she may have to virtually impoverish herself to become eli-
gible for Medicaid benefits.
Patients are being released 'quicker and sicker 88 Many
of the elderly can not take care of their own medical needs
and must seek assistance from the community. Community
health care services are already overworked and under-
staffed, and health care workers are questioning whether
they can service the potential increase in the need for their
services.
In a recent study on the effect of DRGs on commu-
nity based agencies conducted by the Eastern Washington
Area Agency on Aging in Spokane, Washington, it was
found that home health agencies are "bearing the brunt of
the effects of earlier discharges under the DRG system "89
The number of reimbursable home visits rose 27% for
urban home health providers, and professional nursing visits
rose 37% in urban areas and 18% in rural areas.90 Home
care providers are experiencing an increasing need for more
specialized equipment and training.9" A study conducted
by the Home Health Assembly of New Jersey found similar
results: (1) the DRG system has increased the number of
hospital referrals to home health care in New Jersey, (2)
home health agencies have greatly increased their provi-
sion of high technology care in the home in order to res-
pond to the earlier discharges, and (3) home health agen-
cies have expanded their hours of operation to meet
hospital discharge requirements.9 2 Some health care pro-
viders describe this affect on community health services
as the "balloon theory 93 "When you squeeze the middle
of the health care 'balloon by shortening hospital lengths
of stay and discharging hospital patients at reduced func-
tional levels, you enlarge both ends of the health care
'balloon' - meaning that there is an increase in the health
care services being provided both prehospitalization and
post-hospitalization "9
4
Those persons in need of home health care services
are obstructed by an additional hurdle. The policy of the
Health Care Financing Administration makes it difficult to
obtain home health services under Medicare." "To qualify,
a patient must be homebound' and in need of only 'inter-
mittent' care. HCFA has so restricted the definitions of
'homebound' and 'intermittent' care, however, that even the
sicker patients coming out of hospitals under the DRG
system are having trouble qualifying for post acute care ser-
vices at home.'96 This problem is so severe that there is
pending legislation calling for a single national definition
for "homebound" and "intermittent" care.
97
Generally, a beneficiary is considered to be
homebound if he has a condition, due to an ill-
ness or injury which restricts his ability to leave
his place of residence except with the aid of
supportive devices such as crutches, canes,
wheelchairs, and walkers, the use of special
transportation, or the assistance of another per-
son or if he has a condition so that leaving his
home is medically contraindicated.9"
To be considered in need to (sic) 'intermitent'
(sic) skilled nursing care, an individual must re-
quire a skilled nursing service at least once every
60 days. Cases in which a skilled nursing ser-
vice is required only once every 60 days are the
exception rather than the rule. Since the need
for an intermittent skilled nursing service makes
the individual eligible for other covered home
health services, home health claims based on
such a service are carefully reviewed by the in-
termediary. Intermittent skilled nursing care
could include infrequent, yet intermittent, obser-
vation and evaluation visits for the blind diabetic
at least every 90 days, or the changing of an
indwelling silicone catheter at 90-day intervals.
A one-time nursing service is not considered a
need for intermittent skilled nursing care.
However, when the need for a skilled nursing
visit at least once every 60 days is medically
predictable, but a situation arises after the first
visit making additional visits unnecessary; e.g.,
the patient dies or is hospitalized, the one visit
made is reimbursable.99
Some patients are even being discharged directly from
intensive care units while still requiring complex medical
equipment like respirators, suction machines, nasogastro
tubes, urinary catheters and continuous oxygen!"0 In a re-
cent pre- and post- DRG analysis of all referrals for home
health care from a small community hospital in Virginia,
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the most significant finding was that these patients required
more frequent visitation and more intense nursing services
after DRG implementation!' 0'
The community health care agencies, with limited
funds and often understaffed, must find means to cope with
these increases if the elderly are to continue receiving quality
health care. One method used is to increase the length of
time for receiving services and decrease the number of units
per client!'0 2 Among the agencies where DRGs had been
in effect longer, this method has been employed in health
screening, personal care services, chore services, adult day
care, transportation, congregate meals and respite care!'
0 3
In response to the prospective payment system, a
hospital in Santa Monica, California has implemented a
plan to maintain quality health care called 'Planned Ac-
celerated Discharge' (PAD).!0 4 "Under PAD, patients are sent
home three or four days earlier than normal, and the
hospital pays home health agencies to provide nursing,
rehabilitation, therapy, drugs, durable medical equipment
and other services in that period.' A caregiver must be
available in the home for at least fourteen hours a day, and
a nurse is on call twenty-four hours a day.0 6 "PAD has the
potential to save money and improve the hospital's image
by getting patients home sooner. The program cannot be
sold unless the hospital and its medical staff have con-
fidence that the quality of care will be maintained.' 07 This
example of a successful response to the DRG system may
indeed be saying that "quicker and sicker"'0 8 is not neces-
sarily detrimental to the patient if there is adequate sup-
port to back up the hospital.
A potential fear of the community health agencies is
that hospitals, with incentives to cut costs, will view some
illnesses as profitable and others as not, potentially resulting
in discriminatory admission policies and a dual system of
health care'0 9 The Peer Review Organizations, however, are
structured to deter such action. They will randomly review
discharges at least every three months for the previous
three-month period or the period since the last review in
order to verify that the diagnostic and procedural coding
used by the hospitals for DRG assignment is substantiated
by the corresponding medical records!"
The Impact of DRGs on Nursing Homes
If indeed it is true that patients are being discharged
"quicker and sicker " "there is apt to be an increase in the
number of patients with acute care needs requiring nurs-
ing home services. 'No forethought was given to whether
there would be beds or services available to those patients
once they left the hospital or more importantly, who was
going to pay for health services they still required." 2 Some
nursing home ombudsmen report that these persons are
bumping older persons with chronic disabilities
from the waiting lists, exacerbating the difficulty
of gaining access to scarce nursing home beds
for many who are eligible but perceived as less
vulnerable. At the same time many nursing
homes find themselves ill-equipped to provide
appropriate care for these more vulnerable pa-
tients. 3
Not only are the acutely ill patients bumping others,
but there is now an incentive for nursing homes to want
these patients. Resource Utilization Groups (RUGs), the
new means by which Medicaid will reimburse nursing
homes, have been designed to pay according to the acuity
level of the patient and the amount of services they require.
Previously, there was a disincentive to take acutely Ill pa-
tients, since they require more hours of care, more resources
and, therefore, more money; now, there is an incentive. As
a result, nursing homes may have to initially reduce staff
numbers. They will receive less money now for the same
patient that has resided in the nursing home prior to the
implementation of this system. The ability to pay the staff
members may not be adequate until the beds are occupied
with acute care patients. If the potential increase in the
number of patients requiring nursing home placement
materializes, eventually, there will be a back-up of people
waiting for beds when the number of available beds is
already inadequate.
The DRG system encourages early discharge and In-
creases the number of persons requiring additional in-home
health services or nursing home placement. However, the
Health Care Financing Administration's response is incon-
sistent in meeting these needs. Instead of encouraging
skilled nursing facilities to accept Medicare patients, they
have discouraged acceptance by proposing a rule in early
1985 eliminating the 'Waiver of Liability and the "presump-
tion of good faith." 14 The "Waiver of Liability" was provid-
ed for by Congress in order to
'cushion' skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) against
wrong decisions about whether a patient is
covered for SNF care. It is a presumption that
a SNF acts in good faith if incorrect coverage
decisions represent five percent or less of the
providers Medicare case load. If a SNF meets
the presumption, then Medicare will pay for the
uncovered services.''
Conclusion
It is too soon to tell for certain what the impact of
DRGs will be on the quality of health care received by the
elderly. An early report indicates that the new prospective
payment system is affecting health care, and that Medicare
beneficiaries are being released from the hospital "quicker
and sicker" and in need of assistance from other health care
institutions. It is not yet understood whether this
phenomenon addresses a problem within the system or is
a response to what was an abuse of the system.
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DRGs do not specifically account for the severity of
an illness or for multiple ailments. There is congressional
support to amend these provisions, including pending
legislation. Until they are amended, however, they continue
to be obstacles to doctors and hospitals in offering the
highest quality of health care to patients. In order to assure
that neither the hospital or the beneficiary incurs the finan-
cial liability resulting from multiple ailments, patients are
simply leaving the hospital for short periods of time and
readmitting themselves. Certainly, this is not cost effective
or consistent with the intent of the Social Security
Administration.
If "quicker and sicker" accurately describes the effect
of DRGs, the next question is whether local health care
providers can service the inevitable increase in number of
persons requiring their services, and if they can, who will
be responsible for the additional costs? It has been sug-
gested that the prospective payment system will only result
in cost shifting from Medicare expenditures to Medicaid and
the beneficiary's personal resources. Accepting that this will
occur, it seems appropriate for the Federal government to
reevaluate all of their health care expenditures and to
assume some of the burden put upon local communities
because of the DRGs. Since the services that will now be
required outside of the hospital are less expensive than in
the hospital, the prospective payment system will still meet
its goal of cost savings, and the elderly will be assured qual-
ity health care.
Although some studies have been concluded and
others are currently being conducted, the questions posed
in this statement still demand viable solutions, particularly
in view of the interests of those most affected - the elderly.
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